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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
M. B. POWERS, JAMES M. POWERS 
and VERN PETERSEN, d/b/a 
POWERS AND PETERSEN, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
GENE'S BUILDING MATERIALS, 
INC., 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 14812 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for damages arising from a breach of 
contract and from the negligent handling by Appellant of Respondents' 
account which Respondents had with Appellant for the purchase of 
certain building materials. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury with the Honorable Bryant H. 
Croft presiding. A verdict was returned in favor of Respondents 
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in the sum of $11, 679. 45 and judg:c.e!'.t '.-:as er,ter-ed ther-eori b:,· 
Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT O~ APPEAL 
Respondents seek an affirmation of the verdict a!'.d 
judgment. 
STATE~1E~T OF FACTS 
On or about April 30, 1973, Respondents entered i!'.tc 
a contract with Jim Hartwell and Clearfield Realty for the 
construction of two six-plexes in Brigham City, Utah (Ex. 1-P). 
On or about May 7, 1973, Eldon Weber, president of Gene's 
Building Materials, Inc., Glen Campbell, secretary and treasure: 
of Gene's, and Jim Hartwell traveled to Brigham City and met wi:: 
Respondent Jim Powers (R. 158, 185 and 196). At said meeting, 
a letter was delivered by Appellant's officers to Respondent 
Jim Powers offering to furnish Respondents building materials 
for Respondents' twelve-unit apartment house at a guaranteed :;::> 
provided Respondents would pre-pay Appellant for said materials 
(R. 159-60 and Ex. 2-P). 
Said agreement was between Respondents an_d Appellant 
only since Clearfield Realty was not mentioned in said letter 
and Hartwell and his wife were merely mentioned for the purpose 
of being authorized to specify which materials would be neede) 
on the Brigham City job (Ex. 2-P). Note should be made that 
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said letter was addressed to "~!r. Bud Powers and Whomever else 
concerned" and signed by "Eldon E. \~eber, Pres.". 
At the conclusion of the meeting in Powers' office 
in Brigham City, Powers issued a chit authorizing the Box Elder 
County Bank to pay Gene's $54,000.00 for materials to be 
furnished on the Brigham City job (Ex. 3-P). Said bank received 
a Receipt and Lien Release signed by Gene's Building Materials -
Glen D. Ca.mpbell, Sec. (Ex. 3-P). The bank then delivered to 
Weber and Campbell a cashier's check payable to Gene's Building 
~!aterials in the sum of $54,000.00 (Ex. 4-P). 
Appellant's officers, after receiving the cashier's 
check and before leaving Brigham City, drove to the proposed 
construction site to view the same (R. 186 and 210). 
Prior to obtaining Respondents' job, Hartwell had 
a general account with Gene's set up as "Jim Hartwell, 402 W. 
2200 N., Sunset, Utah" (R. 198 and Ex. 7-P). 
After Appellant's officers returned to Salt Lake City, 
a new account was set up in the name of "Jim Hartwell, 
Brigham City Apartments" and the said $54,000.00 was deposited 
therein (R. 198 and Ex. 9-P). 
Appellant immediately started furnishing materials 
on the Brigham City job with the first invoice dated May 9, 
1973 and billed to "Jim Hartwell, Brigham City Apts." (Ex. 5-P). 
Said job proceeded as agreed until September, 1973 when 
Appellant began running Hartwell's other jobs through the 
Brigham City account (R. 163-4 and Ex. 6-P). Said spurious 
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jobs were located in Kaysville, Layton, Riverdale and Clearfield 
and were processed through the Brigham City account by Appellant 
without Respondents' permission (R. 160-1 and Ex. 6-P). 
This problem was further compounded when Appellant, 
on September 14, 1973, transferred $1,901.28 from the Brigham 
City account to Hartwell's general account paying off the 
entire outstanding balance in the said general account (Exs. 7-P 
and 9-P) . 
The only excuse Appellant could give for such unauthorize:I 
activity was that Hartwell had called Eldon Weber and requested , 
that the accounts be consolidated (R. 199). Weber then advised 
the bookkeeper to take care of the consolidation (R. 199). It 
should be noted at this point that the president of the company 
implemented the unauthorized account consolidation (R. 199). 
Weber knew that the said $54,000.00 was to be used 
for materials in the Brigham City job as the following testimony 
indicates (R. 202) : 
"Q. Did you know what the $54,000.00 was to be for 
specifically? 
A. As far as I knew, the materials for the 
Brigham City apartments." 
Weber further admitted that the Brigham Ci_ty job was 
not the usual situation where the lumber company dealt with the 
contractor and not the property owners and where the lumber 
company looked to the contractor for the payment of the materials 
(R. 208-9). 
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The unauthorized use of the said $54,000.00 is further 
highlighted by Weber's testimony as follows (R. 210): 
"Q. There is no question in your mind that you were 
on notice what this money was for, is there? 
A. Yes, I realized it was for the apartment house." 
When Hartwell requested that the accounts be combined, 
Appellant did not notify Respondents that Respondents' money was 
now being used for Hartwell's other jobs (R. 212). 
Construction on the Brigham City job commenced May, 
1973 and was completed on or about March, 1974 (R. 170). In 
the interim, Hartwell left the Brigham City job during the first 
part of 1974 (R. 175). Respondent M. B. Powers had advised his 
brother, Respondent James M. Powers, that he had notified 
Appellant of Hartwell's dismissal from the job (R. 176). 
After Hartwell had left the job, Clearfield Realty 
sent a man up to the Brigham City job a few times after which 
Clearfield Realty discontinued working on the job and Respondents 
completed the job about March, 1974 (R. 170 and 219). 
Respondents did not join Hartwell and Clearfield Realty 
as defendants in the subject litigation since Hartwell's 
whereabouts were unknown and no dispute existed between 
Respondents and Clearfield Realty (R. 130). The prime 
construction contract called for a purchase price of 
$149,340.00 and the apartment complex ultimately cost approximately 
$199,000.00 (R. 123 and Ex. 1-P). Further, Respondents had 
finished the construction of the project themselves. Therefore, 
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in order to resolve the matter, Edwin Higley, Clearfield Realty 
and Respondents entered into a subsequent agreement (R. 123). 
In the spring of 1974, Respondents went to Appellant's 
place of business in Salt Lake City and requested the balance 
of their account assuming that they had a credit balance (R. 
170). The account showed no credit balance and suit was commenced 
on July 15, 1974 (R. 1 and Ex. 9P). 
At the beginning of the trial, the parties stipulated 
that $11,679.45 was the value of the materials not used on 
the Brigham City job (R. 155). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE HAD NO DUTY TO DISQUALIFY HIMSELF 
IN PRESIDING OVER THE SUBJECT LITIGATION. 
The Record is silent as to when counsel for Appellant 
was notified by the court clerk of the judge assigned to try 
the case. All we have is counsel's assertion that he learned 
of the judge assignment approximately 15 minutes before trial 
commenced. Counsel for Respondents was not a party to any 
conversation between Judge Bryant H. Croft and counsel for 
Appellant concerning a disqualification of Judge Croft. 
The Record is silent as to any written or oral motions 
for a continuance of the trial or a change of trial judge. 
Therefore, counsel for Respondents has obtained from the court 
clerk a letter dated March 17, 1977 setting forth the practice 
of assigning cases to judges in the Third Judicial District . 
• 
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Said letter is attached to Respondents' Brief and marked Exhibit A. 
It is also the recollection of counsel for Respondents that he 
received notification of the judge assignment on the day prior 
to trial. 
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that whenever a party desires to disqualify a judge from trying 
a matter, the party must: 
1. File an affidavit of bias or prejudice, as soon as 
practicable after the case has been assigned, setting 
forth the facts and reasons for the belief that such 
bias and prejudice exists; 
2. File with said affidavit a certificate of counsel 
of record that such affidavit and applicatfon are made 
in good faith. 
Respondents assert that there is nothing in the record 
that can be reviewed by an appellate court. There is no affidavit 
of bias or prejudice, no certificate of good faith, and no 
written or oral motions for a continuance or for change of 
trial judge. 
Counsel for Appellant practices law in the Third Judicial 
District and was aware of the practice of the clerk of the court 
in assigning judges the day before trial. Counsel was also aware 
that Judge Croft was a possible judge to be assigned to the case 
and could have either called the clerk's office the afternoon before 
trial or had an affidavit of prejudice ready in the event Judge 
Croft was assigned to the case. Counsel had a further alternative 
of making an oral motion for the record requesting that a new 
judge be assigned to the case and giving his reasons therefor. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-8-
As the record now stands, there is no showing of bias or prejudi~ 
and no basis for removing Judge Croft from the case. There was 
nothing before the court to transfer to another judge. 
In Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 242 P.2d 297 (Utah 1952), 
where an affidavit of prejudice was filed after the trial had 
commenced and pertained to matters alleged to have existed long 
before the trial and a statement by the court during the trial, 
the Supreme Court of Utah observed: 
"Under these circumstances, the filing of such 
affidavit was untimely and hence Rule 63(b)URCP, 
was not violated. This is particularly true in 
view of the fact that the evidence supported the 
decree regardless of any statements made by the 
court." 
In the case at bar, the trial had not yet commenced 
when counsel for Appellant conversed with Judge Croft in chambers. 
It is difficult to see how there could be any basis for bias or 
prejudice by Judge Croft in the subject case. 
In Christensen v. Christensen, 18 Utah 2d 315, 422 P.~ 
534, this Court held that before a judge should be ~isqualifi~ 
from a case an affidavit of prejudice should be filed setting 
forth the facts and reasons for the belief that such bias and 
prejudice exists. This Court further indicated that the reasons 
alleged must be "reasonable" reasons. It was then observed 
at page 536 of the opinion: 
"We detect nothing in the Record, either before or 
after the affidavit, evincing any rancor of any .. 
kind on the part of the trial court, but contrariwise, 
only the application of what we believe to have 
been sound legal principles." 
I 
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The matter at bar was tried before a jury and the 
record is replete with Judge Croft's rulings and instructions 
in the case. Respondents submit that there is no indication 
in the Record showing bias or prejudice against Appellant by 
the Court. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Appellant argues that it should be granted a new 
trial based on newly discovered evidence that one Edwin Higley 
of Clearfield Realty had entered into a settlement agreement 
with Respondents. 
Rule 59(4)URCP, regarding grounds for a new trial, 
provides as follows: 
"Newly discovered evidence, material for the party 
making the application, which he could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced 
at the trial." 
A multitude of cases hold that whether to grant a new 
trial for newly discovered evidence is wholly within the trial court's 
discretion and is conclusive unless the discretion is abused. 
See Greco v. Gentile, 53 P.2d 1155. 
It is also axiomatic that if a party does not exercise 
diligence to discover and produce the alleged newly discovered 
evidence at the trial, the motion for a new trial should not 
prevail. See Shields v. Ekman, 248 P. 122. 
Respondents submit that Appellant with reasonable 
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prior to the time of trial and could have also joined Clearfield 
Realty and Hartwell if Appellant so desired. 
The approach of Appellant in preparing the subject 
case for trial is set forth in counsel's remarks during argument 
of the motion for new trial (R. 228): 
"I don't think on a collection case such as this, 
Your Honor, a deposition is justified." 
At the time Respondents' counsel deposed the officers 
of Appellant, Respondent Jim Powers was present in the office 
of Appellant's counsel and Appellant chose not to take his 
deposition (R. 232). 
Respondents took two depositions and served two sets 
of Interrogatories on Appellant (R. 9, 14 and 15). 
The subject suit was filed on July 15, 1974 and tried 
September 1, 1976 (R. 1 and 64). During this time, Appellant 
chose to take no depositions and to serve only one set of 
Interrogatories which were filed on February 11, 1976 and the 
Answers thereto filed on April 21, 1976 (R. 49 and.56). 
In Respondents' Answers to Interrogatories (R. 56), 
Appellant was advised as follows: 
a. A copy of the prime contract was attached 
setting forth that Jim Hartwell and Clearfield Realty were the 
contractors. 
b. Jim Hartwell, Clearfield Realty and Respondents 
were listed as performing work on the Brigham City job. 
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If Appellant did not desire to pursue further discovery, 
possibly a visit to Clearfield Realty prior to trial would have 
been in order. After a discussion with Clearfield Realty, 
Appellant then had the option of joining Hartwell and Clearfield 
Realty, or either of them, in the subject lawsuit. 
Appellant could have moved under the provisions of 
Rule 19(b) or Rule 20(a) URCP to join Hartwell and/or 
Clearfield Realty. 
Appellant also could have proceeded under Rule 21 URCP 
which provides as follows: 
"Misjoinder of parties is not ground for di~missal 
of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by 
order of the Court on motion of any party or of 
its own initiative at any stage of the action and 
on such terms as are just. Any claim against a 
party may be severed and proceeded with separately." 
Appellant had the further option of proceeding under 
Rule 14 URCP which authorizes third-party practice and would 
have allowed Appellant to bring in Hartwell and/or Clearfield 
Realty as third-party defendants. However, Appellant chose to 
do none of this and was content to wait until after an adverse 
verdict and judgment to assert these rights. 
It should further be noted that Appellant still has 
the option of proceeding against Hartwell and/or Clearfield Realty 
in an independent action. 
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The trial judge observed at page 230 of the Record 
as follows: 
"You could have brought in Clearfield, as well as 
anybody, and Hartwell, too, you see. You have that 
right under the law, but you didn't do so. Now, 
the reason why the plaintiffs' get a judgment 
against Gene's is because they can show only that 
instead of $54,000.00 worth of materials being 
delivered to the Brigham City project for Hartwell, 
they delivered only about $40,000.00 for it. And 
other deliveries to Hartwell made by Gene's and 
charged against the credit of the plaintiffs are 
for other jobs that Hartwell had and your own records 
show that. And so, all they are saying is, 'We gave 
you $54,000.00 for materials and you only gave us 
$40,000.00 worth of materials. We want our money 
back we didn't get our materials for.' And that is 
all this lawsuit was about, as far as this Court 
is concerned." 
The Court further observed at page 231 of the Record: 
"Any judgment is based upon the lawsuit before 
me, not upon the fact you may or may not have had 
a valid suit against Clearfield. I think the reason 
you have a suit against Hartwell and Clearfield is 
that they bought goods from you and didn't pay you 
for it; but instead, by a telephone call, gets you 
to join two accounts and credit the plaintiffs' 
credit with your company on their purchases for 
materials for other jobs. 
"Now, it is between the plaintiffs and the defendant, 
it seems to me. The defendant is going to have to 
get stuck for giving Hartwell and Clearfield credit 
that was due the plaintiffs, but they used it up giving 
Hartwell materials for other jobs. Because I think, 
you have a claim against Clearfield and Hartwell, 
is simply because they purchased materials from yo~ 
that they didn't pay you for. And instead of looking 
to them for credit, you charged the credit of the 
plaintiffs for those materials. So, I think your 
claim against Clearfield and Hartwell is for goods 
sold and delivered." 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
L 
follows: 
-13-
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO 
THE JURY. 
At page 218 of the Record the Court observed as 
"I would simply say in the Record, that after 
considering the evidence in the case and in connection 
with my preparation of the Instruction, it is my 
opinion that neither estoppel or contributory 
negligence are proper issues to be submitted to 
the Jury in the case." 
The evidence believed by the jury and the Court was 
that the Brigham City job commenced May, 1973, Hartwell left 
the job during the first part of 1974, Respondents completed 
the job during March of 1974 and contacted Appellant concerning 
the balance of their account. Further, there is some indication 
that M. B. Powers notified Appellant when Hartwell left the 
job (R. 176). Respondent James Powers testified that he had 
not personally notified Appellant of Hartwell's departure but 
that his brother had notified Appellant of said departure. This 
negates Appellant's argument that Respondents waited an unreasonably 
long time. Appellant's argument is further negated by the fact that 
the job was completed only a month or two before Respondents' 
visit to Appellant in Salt Lake City concerning the .balance of 
their account. 
Appellant further argues that it is impossible for 
Appellant to police individual accounts and that this could 
raise the question of Respondents' contributory negligence. 
This contention is not borne out by the evidence since the 
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evidence was Hartwell talked with Eldon Weber, president of 
Appellant, concerning combining the accounts and the president 
of the company then arranged with the bookkeeper for the 
combining of the accounts. 
In Jury Instruction No. 10 (R. 104) the court presentec 
1 
Appellant's position in the case as follows: 
"The defendant denies that it breached its contract 
with plaintiffs and alleges that it delivered to 
Hartwell the total amount of building materials 
for which plaintiffs had paid defendant the advance 
payment of $54,000.00 and- denies any responsibility 
for the fact that Hartwell may have used some of 
the materials so delivered on other jobs. Defendant 
further denies that it was negligent in the keeping 
of its books or records or that any negligence on 
its part was a proximate cause of any damages 
sustained by plaintiffs." 
Appellant's position was further set forth in 
Instruction No. 12 (R. 106) which provided as follows: 
"It is the duty of a person who has been injured 
by the negligence of another or damaged by a 
breach of contract to use reasonable diligence 
in caring for his injuries or damages and reasonable 
means to prevent their aggravation and to effect 
a recovery. Reasonable diligence and reasonable 
means in such situations depend upon the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case. If one fails 
to use reasonable diligence to care for his injuries 
and they are aggravated as a result of such failure, 
the liability of another, if any, must be limited 
to the amount of damage that would have been suffered 
if the injured person himself had exercised the 
diligence required of him. 
"Thus, at the time Hartwell terminated working on 
the construction of the Brigham City apartments, 
plaintiffs had a duty to advise defendant that 
Hartwell had left the job and that no further 
materials should be furnished to him for use on 
the Brigham City apartments and charged against 
that account. Having failed to notify defendant of 
I 
I 
l 
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such termination, any charges made after such 
termination of goods to Hartwell for use on the 
said apartments would not be chargeable to defendant." 
Respondents submit that Appellant's position as justified 
by the evidence was amply set forth by the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents submit that Appellant had its day in 
court and that the verdict and judgment entered thereon should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD H. THORNLEY 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents 
2610 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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OFFICE OF CLERK 
P.O. BOX 1860, 240 EAST 4TH SOUTH 
Mr. Richard H. Thornley 
Attorney at Law 
2610 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 
Dear Sir: 
March 17th, 1977 
EXHIBIT "A" 
W. STERLING EVANS 
CLERK 
PARKER ROBISON 
CHIEF DEPUTY 
Pursuant to your request for information relative to procedures in 
notifying counsel as to pending cases set for a specific date in 
the Third Judicial District Court, please be advised the procedure 
is set forth as follows: 
On the day prior to the date on which cases are scheduled for trial, 
the Docket Clerk and his Assistant make a determination as to which 
cases are going to be tried and these cases are then assigned to a 
particular Judge. Sometime between the hours of 3:00 P.M. and 5:00 
P.M., respective counsel are notified by telephone by the said 
Docket Clerk or his Assistant as to the name of the Judge assigned 
to try the case and the time the case will commence. 
With particular respect to the case of M. B. Powers, et al -vs- Gene's 
Building Materials, Inc., Case No. 220946, which case was scheduled 
for trial on September lst, 1976, it is the opinion of the undersigned 
based on established·practice as outlined above, all counsel, to-wit, 
Richard H. Thornley and Matt Biljanic, were notified on the day prior 
to the trial which was set for September lst, 1976, at least one hour 
prior to 5:00 P.M. as to the name of the Judge Assigned to try the 
case, to-wit the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, and as to the time of trial, 
which was ten o'clock A.M. Said notice would have been given to counsel 
personally or by leaving word with a Secretary in the said Law Office. 
Very truly yours, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
